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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATIVE 
RESTRICTIONS ON THE EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 
OF LEGAL RESIDENT ALIENS 
IN NEW YORK STATE 
L INTRODUCTION 
The legal resident alien 1 in the United States today is, by stat-
ute, denied access to many occupations and professions.2 Although 
in the early history of the United States the alien was afforded a 
warm welcome, United States policy toward aliens has changed 
since that time.3 The change is evident in United States immigra-
tion policy. In the country's early years there were virtually no 
restrictions upon alien immigration into the United States. Con-
gressional restrictions on aliens were just initiated in 1875.4 Today, 
a comprehensive scheme of regulation exists under the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Act.5 
The political rights of aliens who have gained entry into the 
United States are also subject to restriction. Twenty-two states 
and territories formerly granted aliens or declarant aliens6 the 
right to vote.7 By the 1928 national elections, however, no alien in 
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1976). "The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing perma-
nently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such 
status not having changed." 
2. See, e.g., occupations cited, note 15 infra. 
3. M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW (1946). 
4. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. Actually, the scope of restriction of this 
statute was fairly limited, excluding only felons and prostitutes. As stated in § 5: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for aliens of the following classes to immigrate into the 
United States, namely, persons who are undergoing a sentence for conviction in 
their own country of felonious crimes other than political or growing out of or the 
result of such political offenses, or whose sentence has been remitted on condition 
of their emigration, and women "imported for the purposes of prostitution." 
5. 8 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1362 (1976). 
6. Declarant aliens are those who have "declared their intention to become citizens .... " 
Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 114 (1931). Statutes re-
stricting aliens from certain types of employment may sometimes exempt declarant aliens. 
See, e.g .. N.Y. EDUC. LAW§ 3001(3) (McKinney 1970) which states that, 
The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien teacher 
now or hereafter employed, provided such teacher shall make due application to 
become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a 
citizen. 
7. M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 180 (1946). 
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any state was eligible to vote for any elected official.8 
At common law there were very few restrictions on an alien's 
right to work in this country.9 Alien labor was seen as essential to 
its overall development.10 A combination of factors, however, led 
to the enactment of restrictive legislation in the employment field. 
United States citizens often viewed aliens as political radicals and 
with fear. In addition, aliens competed with citizens in the job 
market.11 Restrictive legislation thus developed as a result of the 
influence of pressure groups hoping to preclude aliens from com-
peting in particular fields. 12 
New York has historically been a leading state in the amount 
of legislation enacted restricting the entry of aliens into certain 
occupations and professions.13 The first such restrictive statute in 
that state was passed in 1871.14 Following the enactment of this 
statute, New York initiated a succession of statutes requiring citi-
zenship, or a declaration of intention to become a citizen, in at 
least thirty-eight occupations and professions.15 
Limited progress has been made in the repeal of these stat-
utes.16 Some statutes have been judicially repealed or modified by 
8. "For the first time in over a hundred years, a national election was held in 1928 in 
which no alien in any state had the right to cast a vote for a candidate for any office- na-
tional, state, or local." Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114, 
114 (1931). 
9. Haralambie, Employment Rights of Resident Aliens in Arizona, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 
409 (1978). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 411. 
12. M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 195 (1946). 
13. Id. at 196-97. 
14. 1871 N.Y. Laws ch. 486, currently N.Y. Jun. LAW§ 460 (McKinney 1968). The stat-
ute has no force following In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) although it has not been re-
pealed. 
15. Brief for Appellee, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). The occupations listed in 
this brief include in order of enactment: attorneys, pawnbrokers, laborers on public employ-
ment projects, traffickers in liquor, certified public accountants, blind adult vendors of 
goods and newspapers, private investigators, certified shorthand reporters, ship masters, 
pilots and engineers, bank directors and trustees, architects, state police officers, teachers, 
surveyors, operators of billiard and pocket pool halls, medical doctors, pharmacists, real 
estate brokers, embalmers and undertakers, engineers, dentists, forest preserve guides, 
nurses, employees of a competitive class in civil service, racing track parti-mutual em-
ployees, funeral directors, veterinarians, psychologists, dental hygienists, employees of 
private institutions acquired by the state, landscape architects, chiropractors, masseurs and 
masseuses, physical therapists and animal health technicians. Id. at 19-22. 
16. See, e.g., N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 7305 (McKinney) (repealed 1971) which required citi-
zenship for architects; N.Y. Enuc. LAW§ 7404 (McKinney) (repealed 1971) which required 
citizenship for certified public accountants. 
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the Supreme Court of the United States or New York state 
courts.17 A substantial number of statutes, however, retain dis-
criminatory citizenship requirements as a prerequisite for certain 
professions and occupations.18 
It is the purpose of this Note to examine the most significant 
statutory restrictions which remain applicable to the legal resi-
dent alien of New York.19 In order to understand the present and 
future status of these statutes, it is necessary to compare them 
with past statutory citizenship restrictions. Such an understand-
ing requires an analysis of the constitutional limitations which 
have been applied to restrictive statutes. The major limitations to 
be examined are the doctrines of federal preem.ption and equal 
protection. Under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States has estab-
lished a standard of strict judicial scrutiny for restrictive statutes. 
Several recent Supreme Court decisions20 upholding New York 
statutes with citizenship requirements, however, indicate a possi-
ble retreat or deviation from this standard. With this background 
in mind, the constitutionality of New York's restrictive employ-
ment statutes will be considered. 
IL CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
Legislation restricting aliens as a class is subject to certain 
constitutional limitations. State legislation comes under the doc-
trine of federal preemption when it appears that the state is en-
croaching upon matters dealt with by federal regulation. Often 
restrictive state legislation is declared unconstitutional under the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 21 
17. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3001(3) 
(McKinney 1970) which restricts non-citizens from teacher certification unconstitutional; see 
also Kulkarni v. Nyquist, 446 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), holding N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 
6534(6) (McKinney 1972), which similarly restricts physical therapists_,and N.Y. EDUC. LAW§ 
7206(1)(6) (McKinney), which similarly restricts engineers, unconstituticmal. 
18. See, e.g., N. Y. Eouc. LA w §§ 6554(6) (chiropractors), 6604(6) (dentists), 6805(6) 
(pharmacists), 7504(6) (certified shorthand reporters), 7804(6) (masseurs) (McKinney 1972); 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 215(3) (state troopers) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 
440(a) (real estate brokers) (McKinney 1968). 
19. It is not within the scope of this Note to examine restrictive legislation dealing 
with the illegal alien. 
20. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1 provides that, "No State shall ... deny -to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
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A. Federal Preemption 
Under the supremacy clause, the federal government is 
granted exclusive control over immigration and naturalization.22 
Congress has specified, in the Immigration and Nationality Act,23 
which aliens are to be admitted and which aliens are to be excluded 
from the United States. In Truax v. Raich,24 the first case holding 
constitutional limits on a state's power to limit alien employment, 
the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an Arizona 
statute requiring an employer of five or more persons to hire at 
least four citizens out of every five new employees. The Court 
decided that control over immigration was vested solely in the 
federal government and that a state may not deprive lawfully ad-
mitted aliens of the right to earn a living in common occupations of 
the community. The Court considered such state legislation tanta-
mount to denying aliens admission into the country and residency. 
Though this statute did not directly regulate or control immigra-
tion, the deprivation of the right to work acted as an effective 
deterrent to immigration.25 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
federal preemption doctrine in Graham v. Richardson.26 In that 
decision the Court held that state alien residency requirements 
encroached upon exclusive federal power and are constitutionally 
impermissible.27 
22. U.S. CONST. art. l, § 8, cl. 4. 
23. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1976). The aliens denied admis-
sion into the United States by statute include those who are retarded, insane, drug addicts, 
and dangerously diseased as well as those who are beggars, polygamists, prostitutes and 
anarchists. In relation to employment, the statute excludes all aliens who are "seeking to 
enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor," unless 
they have received certification through the Secretary of Labor. 
24. 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
25. Id. at 42. 
26. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
27. In Graham, the Court states that, "[t]he National Government has broad constitu-
tional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period 
they may remain, and regulation of their conduct before naturalization .... Pursuant to 
that power, Congress has provided, as part of a comprehensive plan for the regulation of 
immigration and naturalization ... . "Id. at 377. The Court further states that "[s]tate laws 
that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their alienage 
conflict with these overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the 
Federal Government." Id. at 378. In Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) a similar view is 
expressed. "[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this 
field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation ... , states cannot, inconsistently with 
the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or compliment, the federal law, or 
4
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The federal preemption doctrine has limited statutes restrict-
ing alien employment. Lower courts, however, may choose not to 
reach the question of federal preemption. It is possible to consider 
the question of whether the restrictive statute in question is con-
stitutional solely on equal protection grounds.28 
B. Equal Protection 
The basis of the second major constitutional limitation upon 
state legislation restricting aliens as a class in the employment 
field is found in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment.29 It has been firmly established that an alien, after 
being admitted into the United States, is entitled to equal protec-
tion under the laws.30 A legal resident alien is included within the 
meaning of a person under the fourteenth amendment.31 The cases 
of Truax v. Raich32 and Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission33 
expanded protection of the alien by establishing equal access to 
employment as a fundamental right guaranteed by the fourteenth 
amendment.34 
enforce additional or auxiliary regulations." Id. at 66-67. See also, Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915). 
28. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973). 
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
30. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), where the Court held invalid a 
municipal ordinance regulating the operation of laundries because it was discriminatorily 
enforced against Chinese operators; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), where the Court 
held invalid an Arizona statute requiring that an employer hire at least eighty percent citi-
zens under the fourteenth amendment; Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 
410 (1948), where a California statute barring the issuance of fishing licenses to aliens was 
held to discriminate against aliens as a class. 
31. The Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), stated that 
[t]hese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of na-
tionality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal 
laws .... The questions we have to consider and decide in these cases, therefore, 
are to be treated as involving the rights of every citizen of the United States 
equally with those of the strangers and aliens who now invoke the jurisdiction of 
the court. 
Id. at 369. See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 
33, 39 (1915); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). 
32. 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
33. 334 u .s. 410 (1948). 
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. The Court in Takahaski added the further insight 
that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment and the laws adopted under its authority thus embody a 
general policy that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide 'iri any state' on an equal-
ity of legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws." 334 U.S. at 420. 
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Several cases have established the standard of scrutiny to be 
employed in determining whether a statute permissibly discrimi-
nates against aliens as a class.35 The Supreme Court in Graham v. 
Richardson36 first articulated a standard of strict judicial scrutiny 
to be applied to aliens classified, in a statute, as a group. The 
Court held in that case that classifications based on alienage are 
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny .37 The 
state has a heavy burden of justification to show that such a stat-
ute is "necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the ac-
complishment of a permissible state policy ."38 Generally the Court 
has continued to apply a standard of strict judicial scrutiny .39 Stat-
utes have been struck down on the grounds that they are not 
necessary to achieve the state's purpose,40 or that the state inter-
est is insufficient to warrant complete exclusion of all aliens.41 
Therefore, where a standard of strict scrutiny is involved, "the 
governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to 
be carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest 
is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether 
the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely 
drawn."42 
In contrast, in several recent decisions the Supreme Court of 
the United States has .refused to apply a standard of strict judicial 
scrutiny.43 Those decisions were reached notwithstanding state 
statutes discriminating against aliens as a class.44 In those cases 
35. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); In 
re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
36. 403 u .s. 365 (1971). 
37. "[C]lassifications based on alienage ... are inherently suspect and subject to close 
judicial scrutiny." Id. at 372. Aliens as a class have been referred to as a "discrete and in-
sular minority." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). In McLaughlin the Court states that such classi-
fications are subject to the "most rigid scrutiny" and "in most circumstances irrelevant to 
any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose." Id. at 192. See also Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 
(1943). 
38. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). 
39. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); In 
re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
40. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 724. 
41. Id. at 725. 
42. Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605 (1976). 
43. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
44. Norwick, supra note 43, at 74; Foley, supra note 43, at 293. 
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the Court applied a rational basis test.45 When the rational basis 
test is used, the statute in question is normally accorded a pre-
sumption of constitutionality which may not be disturbed unless 
the enactment is shown to rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to 
the achievement of the state's objective.46 If the rational relation 
standard is used, the state no longer has the heavy burden of justi-
fying the discriminatory statute.47 
IIL TRADITIONAL RATIONALES JUSTIFYING 
RESTRICTIVE STATE LEGISLATION 
The majority of state legislation denying the alien access to 
certain occupations and professions has traditionally been justified 
under three broad rationales. First, through a proprietary interest 
in its natural resources, a state may restrict certain occupations 
derived from those resources.48 Second, as an outgrowth of this 
doctrine, a state holds a proprietary interest in certain occupa-
tions.49 Lastly, under the police power a state may regulate occu-
pations of a dangerous or antisocial nature and make reasonable 
classifications in the interest of the public health, safety and 
morals.50 Some of the different occupations and professions denied 
by statute to the alien will be categorized under these three broad 
rationales. 
A. The State's Proprietary Interest in Its Natural Resources 
The view that a state's interest in its natural resources justi-
fies regulation of occupations dealing with these resources is 
thought to have its basis in a common law property rationale.51 
. Two major Supreme Court decisions52 restricting the right of 
aliens to share in natural resources were based on the property ra-
45. Id. 
46. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); see also Williamson v. Lee Opti-
cal, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
47. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); 
Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947). 
48. Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 1012, 1014 (1957). 
49. Id. at 1016-21. 
50. Id. at 1021-27. 
51. In England, title to game was in the King who held it for the use of his subjects. 
Therefore the right to acquire game was subject to governmental authority. Id. at 1014. 
52. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (killing wild game) and McCready v. 
Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (growing oysters). 
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tionale. In McCready v. Virginia53 a Virginia statute prohibiting 
anyone who was not a citizen of the state from taking or planting 
oysters in certain rivers was held constitutional. The Court 
reasoned that the owners of the public property of the state are 
its citizens and that its use may naturally be restricted to them. 
Though McCready did not directly differentiate between aliens 
and citizens, it served as an important precedent for later deci-
sions restricting the alien's right to employment.54 
Truax v. Raich55 extended equal protection under the four-
teenth amendment to aliens as to a fundamental right of employ-
ment, but the decision left open certain areas where restrictive 
legislation may be considered constitutional. It was indicated by 
the Court that the use of a state's natural resources could be re-
stricted to citizens. The Court observed that a state would be 
more capable of showing specific danger to its general welfare if 
its natural resources are involved than if common occupations of 
the community are concerned.56 
In Patsone v. Pennsylvania,51 the Supreme Court, taking ad-
vantage of the Truax natural resources exception, found constitu-
tional a statute which prohibited aliens from hunting for pleasure 
in the state of Pennsylvania.58 The Court found as a rational basis 
for the statute that a state may protect and preserve its wild 
game for its citizens.59 
Today the restriction of aliens from occupations dealing with 
natural resources is no longer a constitutionally permissible state 
objective. The Supreme Court, in Takahashi v. Fish and Game 
Commission,60 applied the rational basis test and found that a Cali-
fornia statute barring aliens from obtaining fishing licenses61 was 
53. 94 U.S. 391 (1876). 
54. E.g., Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (only citizens to build a subway); Crane v. 
New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (right to contract for labor). 
55. 239 u .s. 33 (1915). 
56. The discrimination defined by the act does not pertain to the regulation or 
distribution of the public domain, or of the common property or resources of the 
people of the State, the enjoyment of which may be limited to its citizens as 
against both aliens and the citizens of other States. 
Id. at 39-40. 
57. 232 U.S. 138 (1914). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 145-46. 
60. 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
61. 1945 Cal. Stats., ch. 181, currently CAL. FISH & GAME CODE§ 7149 (West). 
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unconstitutional. The opinion that this type of exclusion is no 
longer permissible is reinforced by the fact that the Supreme 
Court has initiated a standard of strict judicial scrutiny whenever 
aliens are treated as a class.62 
In addition to restricting aliens from occupations dealing with 
natural resources, states have in the past successfully excluded 
aliens from certain state-related occupations. Legislatures have 
claimed a special proprietary interest over occupations under 
State control. 
B. The State's Proprietary Interest Over Certain Occupations 
A state's proprietary interest over employment positions in 
government agencies and departments developed out of the com-
mon property theory. Since a state he1:s the absolute right of 
ownership over the use of public property, it may be reasoned 
that public employment opportunities are a privilege which a state 
may grant or withhold at its own discretion.63 The Supreme Court 
in Heim v. McCall64 considered a New York statute prohibiting the 
employment of aliens on public works. The statute also prohibited 
certain persons who contracted with the state from employing 
aliens.65 The statute was held to be constitutional. The Court 
reasoned that it was within a state's own right to prescribe the 
conditions under which public works projects are completed.66 In 
this case the condition was the exclusion of alien laborers.67 
In Crane v. New York,68 the Court, in effect, reiterated the 
view that the right to employment in public works is a privilege 
rather than a right dependent on citizenship.69 In contrast, in 
C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd. v. Board of Education,70 a New York 
62. See discussion, supra notes 36-42. 
63. See Note, supra note 48. 
64. 239 u .s. 175 (1915). 
65. 1909 N.Y. Laws, ch. 36, § 31 (Consol.): 
§ 14: Preference in employment of persons upon public works. In the construc-
tion of public works by the state or a municipality, or by persons contracting with 
the state or such municipality, only citizens of the United States shall be em-
ployed; and in all cases where laborers are employed on any such public works, 
preference shall be given citizens of the state of New York. 
66. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. at 191. 
67. Id. at 193. 
68. 239 U.S. 195 (1915). 
69. Id. at 196. 
70. 412 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd 429 U.S. 1031 (1977). 
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Labor Law statute71 giving preference in the construction of pub-
lic works to New York citizens was held unconstitutional.72 The 
statute displayed a preference for citizens who had been residents 
of New York State for at least twelve consecutive months.73 The 
Court found within the statute an invidious classification. The law-
fully admitted resident alien was put in a class with fewer privi-
leges than were enjoyed by citizens of the state. The Court found 
no compelling justification to support the statute.74 The right-
privilege distinction and special public interest doctrines of Heim 15 
and Crane 16 were held insufficient to justify the statute.77 The 
Court did not consider the state's interest in this occupation im-
portant enough to justify the exclusion. The state, the Court 
reasoned, has an equal duty to all of its lawful residents including 
aliens to keep unemployment as low as possible.78 
The legal resident alien's right to employment in public works 
appears to have been established in New York by C.D.R. Enter-
prises.19 State restrictions on government occupations of a profes-
sional nature had once been justified under the right-privilege and 
special public interest justifications. These justifications seem no 
longer viable.8° For this reason, occupations of a professional 
nature will be examined in the next section. 
C. The State's Police Power 
The legal resident alien may not be denied the right to en-
gage in an ordinary occupation of the community under the Consti-
tution.81 He is to be treated on equal terms with citizens wherever 
the public welfare is not involved.82 Under the police power of the 
71. N.Y. LAB. LAW§ 222 (McKinney 1965). 
72. 412 F. Supp. at 1172. 
73. N.Y. LAB. LAW§ 222 (McKinney 1965). 
74. 412 F. Supp. at 1171. 
75. 239 U.S. 191 (1915). 
76. 239 U.S. 195 (1915). 
77. 412 F. Supp. at 1170. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. Graham rejects the concept that constitutional rights turn on whether a 
government benefit is a right or a privilege. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
"Taken together, Graham and Takahashi sufficiently weaken the value of Crane and Heim 
as precedents for upholding state laws denying aliens government employment and, there-
fore, those cases can be viewed as implicitly overruled and no longer law." Sugarman v. 
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
81. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). 
82. Id. at 39-40. 
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state, however, certain types of employment may be prohibited or 
conditionally controlled.83 A state may require a license under its 
police power in order to make reasonable qualifications in the in-
terest of the public health, safety, and welfare.84 A license may be 
denied to an alien if there is some logical relation between the ex-
clusion of the alien and the protection of the public.85 
Some states in the past have excluded aliens from employ-
ment in occupations of a dangerous or anti-social nature under the 
police power.86 In Clark v. Deckebach,81 the Supreme Court held 
that it was not unconstitutional to prohibit aliens from the opera-
tion of pool and billiard rooms by the denial of a license.88 The 
classification was held to have a rational basis because of the 
Court's assumption that aliens were not as qualified as citizens to 
engage in "conduct of a dubious nature."89 The Court accepted the 
view that since aliens were less likely to be familiar with local con-
ditions, they would not be as well equipped as a citizen to deal 
with the maintenance of what the court characterized as an inher-
ently dangerous enterprise.90 The rationale of Clarke has been 
questioned,91 but its basic holding has never been overruled. New 
York State still retains the discriminatory citizenship requirement 
for operation of billiard and pocket pool halls.92 
In the professional fields, which normally require licensure 
under the state's police power,93 citizenship requirements in New 
York are apparently based on the assumption that an alien is defi-
cient in either his moral or educational background. The licensure 
requirements leading to the exclusion of aliens were ultimately 
83. See Note, supra note 48. 
84. See id. at 1021-27. 
85. See id. at 1021-27. 
86. See id. at 1021. 
87. 274 U.S. 392 (1927). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 397. 
90. Id. 
91. In both Sugarman and In re Griffiths the Court indicated that Takahashi v. Fish 
and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), weakened the doctrinal foundations of Clarke. In 
re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 645 (1973). 
92. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§ 461 (McKinney Supp. 1978-79). 
93. The constitutionality of statutes requiring licensure is well established in New 
York State. See, e.g .. Roman v. Lobe, 213 A.D. 162, 208 N.Y.S. 617 (1925), aff'd, 150 N.E. 
535, 241 N.Y. 514 (1925), aff'd, 152 N.E. 461, 243 N.Y. 51 (1926); Sockel v. Degel Yehudo, 268 
A.2d 207, 49 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1944); Groetzinger v. Forest Hills Terrace Corp., 123 Misc. 274, 
205 N.Y.S. 125 (1924). 
11
Schenk: Rights of Legal Resident Aliens
Published by SURFACE, 1979
120 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 7:109 
designed to protect the public from the ineptitude, inexperience or 
dishonesty of persons not qualified to practice a particular profes-
sion.94 
An example of a restricted profession is the field of real 
estate brokerage. Licensure there is thought to be helpful in the 
prevention of fraud upon the trusting public95 and in assuring com-
petency and observance of professional conduct in a relationship 
which presents many opportunities to extract illicit gains by con-
cealment and collusion.96 
Though regulation through licensing is necessary to protect 
the public interest, statutes similar to the New York legislation re-
quiring brokers to be citizens97 may be unconstitutional. Assuming 
that real estate brokerage is a "common occupation of the com-
munity"98 and that a standard of strict scrutiny is judicially ap-
plied, it is likely that the statute would be declared invalid. The 
case of Satoskar v. Indiana Real Estate Commission, 99 affirmed on 
appeal by the Supreme Court, confirms this view. In Satoskar 
plaintiffs successfully challenged the constitutionality of an Indi-
ana statute precluding aliens from applying for or obtaining real 
estate licenses. 
There should be an increased awareness in the courts of the 
unconstitutional nature of many of these restrictive licensure re-
quirements .100 California, in contrast to New York, has taken firm 
action toward the abolishment of such requirements. 101 The opin-
ion of the California Attorney General states that, in the absence 
of a reasonable connection between the requirements of citizen-
ship and an individual's fitness to practice a given profession or 
94. Dodge v. Richmond, 5 A.D.2d 593, 173 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1958). 
95. Id. The statute involved in this case relating to the licensing of real estate brokers 
and salesmen was designed to "protect the public from inept, inexperienced or dishonest 
persons who might perpetrate or aid in the perpetration of frauds upon it, and to establish 
protective or qualifying standards to that end." Id. at 787-88. 
96. In re Wilson Sullivan Co., 289 N.Y. 110, 44 N.E.2d 387, 33 N.Y.S. 203 (1942). 
97. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 440(a) (McKinney 1968). 
98. See discussion, supra notes 36-42. In view of Griffiths, the State Department is no 
longer enforcing the requirement though it has not yet been repealed by the legislature. 
Letter from New York Department of State to Claire M. Schenk (November 2, 1978). 
99. 417 u .s. 938 (197 4). 
100. See discussion, supra notes 8 & 84; infra note 101. 
101. California has repealed a statute similar to N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 440(a) (McKin-
ney 1968), CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10150.5 (West) (repealed 1972) which was repealed in 
addition to other citizenship requirements dealing with common occupations of the commun-
ity. 
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vocation, United States citizenship is not a valid requirement for 
professional licensure and such a requirement would be violative 
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 102 
This opinion is based on Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State 103 
where the California Supreme Court found that a classification 
which discriminates arbitrarily on the basis of status has no ra-
tional basis. Purdy holds that it is not a legitimate interest to 
favor United States citizens. The California court indicated that a 
statute justified by this reason will fail notwithstanding whether a 
standard of strict scrutiny is applied.104 
Several recent New York cases 105 indicate that the New York 
courts may be gradually moving toward a viewpoint similar to 
California. In Surmeli v. New York, 106 the constitutionality of New 
York Education Law§ 6524(6) 107 was challenged by eight Turkish 
physicians who were residents of New York and had been licensed 
to practice under the statute. Each was now being excluded from 
his profession for failure to have become a citizen as required 
within a statutory time period of ten years from the date of licen-
sure. The district court for the South District of New York found 
that there was no rational basis for the requirement of continued 
licensure as the physicians had already been qualified and licensed 
and had demonstrated professional competency for a significant 
time period. The state's argument that a political commitment to 
the United States was desirable and necessary to promote stabil-
ity for his patient's welfare was rejected by the court.108 
102. 55 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 80 (1972). 
103. Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State, 71Cal.2d 566, 456 P .2d 645, 79 Cal. Rpt r. 77 (1969). 
104. Id. 
105. 412 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F'.2d 560 (2d Cir . 1976), cert. denied, 436 
U.S. 903 (1978); Kulkarni v. Nyquist, 446 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). 
106. 412 F . Supp. at 394. 
107. N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 6524(6) (McKinney 1972), which requires that in order to qualify 
for a license as a physician an applicant must " . .. be a United States citizen, or file a 
declaration of intention to become a citizen, unless such requirement is waived, in accord-
ance with the commissioner's regulations .... "This section replaced former§ 6509 (repealed 
1971) which stated: 
There shall be issued to an applicant who, when admitted to the licensing ex-
amination, was a citizen of a foreign country, and who had declared intention of 
becoming a citizen of the United States, upon passing the examination, a license 
but upon failure of such licensee within ten years from the date of such declaration 
of intention to furnish evidence that he has become a citizen his license shall termi-
nate and his registration shall be annulled. 
N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 6509 (McKinney) (repealed 1971). 
108. 412 F. Supp. at 397. 
13
Schenk: Rights of Legal Resident Aliens
Published by SURFACE, 1979
122 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 7:109 
In Kulkarni v. Nyquist,1°9 the holding of Surmeli110 was broad-
ened. Kulkarni held several citizenship requirements to be un-
constitutional because of their denial to aliens of access to certain 
professions. m This case, unlike Surmeli, did not involve profes-
sionals who had already demonstrated their competency through 
years of practice but did involve qualified aliens desiring to enter 
certain professions. Though the court found the citizenship re-
quirements clearly unconstitutional, it refused to certify those 
aliens as the representatives of a class of qualified legal resident 
aliens denied access to professions through citizenship require-
ments. This decision is indicative of an attitude of conservatism in 
New York courts. In choosing to consider requirements on a purely 
case-by-case basis the judiciary may be preserving an option to 
withdraw protection of the employment rights of legal resident 
aliens. 
IV. CURRENT RATIONALE JUSTIFYING 
RESTRICTIVE STATE LEGISLATION 
New York courts may find a possible avenue of retreat from 
the expanded protection of the employment rights of the legal 
resident alien by relying on the rationale of Sugarman v. Dougall.112 
In Sugarman, the Supreme Court applied a standard of strict judi-
cial scrutiny and held invalid a New York Civil Service statute113 
which prohibited non-United States citizens from holding perma-
nent positions in competitive classes of the state civil service. 114 
Although the Court held this particular discriminatory statute to 
be unconstitutional in this decision, it stated that there may be 
certain situations where a state may be justified in excluding 
aliens from certain types of employment. 115 The type of occupation 
109. 446 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). 
110. 412 F. Supp. at 397-98. 
111. 446 F. Supp. at 1271; N.Y. Eouc. LAW§§ 6534 (physical therapists) and 7206 (engi-
neers) (McKinney 1972). 
112. 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
113. N.Y. C1v. SERV. LAW§ 53 (McKinney 1973). 
114. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
115. We do not hold that, on the basis of an individualized determination, an alien 
may not be refused, or discharged from, public employment, even on the basis of 
noncitizenship, if the refusal to hire, or the discharge, rests on legitimate state in-
terests that relate to qualifications for a particular position or to the charac-
teristics of the employee .... 
Neither do we hold that a State may not, in an appropriately defined class of 
positions, require citizenship as a qualification for office .... Such power inheres 
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with which the Court is concerned is of a political nature, particu-
larly where important elective and non-elective state positions are 
involved.116 
The notion of the necessity of the preservation of "the basic 
conception of a political community" 111 is not new to New York.118 
The political rights of aliens have been restricted in New York for 
a significant period of time.119 Aliens are not allowed to hold public 
office, 120 to vote, 121 or to serve on juries.122 The citizenship require-
ment for jurors is well established and has been upheld by the 
Supreme Court of the United States as recently as 1976.123 In 
Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County, 124 the Court stated 
that a jury was an institution at the heart of the country's system 
of government. The Court indicated that an alien, specifically 
because of his status as a non-citizen, was unable to serve.125 
In Foley v. Connelie, 126 the political exception in Sugarman 
was used to uphold a New York statute121 excluding aliens from 
employment as state troopers. The Supreme Court indicated that 
a standard of strict judicial scrutiny would not be applied where 
rights and privileges involving an alien's participation in the 
democratic processes were concerned.128 Political policy making 
in the State by virtue of its obligation ... 'to preserve the basic conception of a 
political community' .... And this power and responsibility of the State applies, 
not only to the qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding state elective or 
important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who 
participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy 
perform functions that go the heart of representative government. 
413 U.S. at 646-47. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 647. 
118. "New York accordingly, acted during the first fifty years of independence to 
refine its 'political community.'" Brief for Appellee at 18, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 
(1977). 
119. "By 1825 it was clear that aliens were excluded from public office, voting and jury 
service.'' Id.; 1825 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 307, § 4. 
120. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW§ 3 (McKinney 1952). 
121. N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 1. 
122. N.Y. Juo. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1975); N.Y. C1v. RIGHTS LAW § 13 (McKinney 
1976). 
123. Perkins v. Smith, 426 U.S. 913 (1976). 
124. 396 U.S. 320 (1970). 
125. Id. at 332. 
126. 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
127. N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 215(3) (McKinney 1972). 
128. The Court in Foley stated: "The State need only justify its classification by a 
showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the 
limiting classification.'' 435 U.S. at 296. 
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aspects of a state trooper's job were emphasized by the Court in 
finding that citizenship is a compelling and necessary require-
ment.129 The New York decision, the Court felt, indicated that an 
alien would be less "personally committed to the proper applica-
tion and enforcement of the laws of the United States" than a citi-
zen.130 The underlying assumption is that an alien is less interested 
in the preservation of the state than a citizen. The Court was also 
concerned that an alien may potentially encounter a conflict of 
loyalties.131 The decision recognizes that a state may reasonably 
presume a citizen to be more familiar with, and sympathetic to, 
American traditions than an alien.132 This rationale has been re-
jected by a number of cases.133 Those courts have asserted that an 
alien is no less capable of understanding American law or appreci-
ating American institutions or being loyal and committed to the 
United States than is a citizen.134 
The choice of the Court in Foley to draw an analogy between 
state troopers and jurors is also subject to criticism. A comparison 
between the duties of a policeman and those of an attorney135 
would bear a much greater similarity. Both involve long term com-
mitments to a profession dealing with the law. It appears that the 
Court in Foley has glossed over the many mechanical, routine 
functions of a state trooper. A state trooper has an obligation to 
enforce, but not to create, the law. 
The dissent in Foley acknowledges the inconsistency between 
Griffiths and Foley. 136 It also points out that the majority based its 
holding upon language which is essentially dictum.137 Crucial to the 
majority's decision is its characterization of the job of a state 
trooper as a policy-making position. Nowhere, however, is the line 
between policy making and non-policy making positions drawn in a 
clear and consistent fashion. 138 
129. Id. at 297-98. 
130. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
131. Id. at 897-98. 
132. 435 U.S. at 299-300. 
133. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); In re Park, 484 P.2d 690 (1971); Raffaelli v. 
Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264 (1972) (en bane). 
134. Id. 
135. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
136. "Unless the Court repudiates its holding in In re Griffiths, ... it must reject any 
conclusive presumption that aliens, as a class, are disloyal or untrustworthy." Foley v. Con-
nelie, 435 U.S. 291, 308 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
137. 435 U.S. at 303 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
138. 435 U.S. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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The decision in Foley also shows some inconsistencies with 
the decision in Nyquist v. Mauclet. 139 In Mauclet, the Supreme 
Court held a New York statute140 barring resident aliens from 
state financial assistance for higher education to be in violation of 
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.141 Al-
though this case dealt with an alien's right to an education rather 
than employment, the Supreme Court discussed the political ex-
ception of Sugarman. 142 The Court, in speaking of the narrow 
scope of the exception in Foley, states that, "as Sugarman makes 
quite clear, the Court had in mind a State's historical and constitu-
tional powers to define the qualifications of voters, or of 'elective 
or important nonelective' officials 'who participate directly in the 
formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy."'143 
Perhaps the inconsistency between the decisions of the Court 
in Griffiths and Mauclet in light of Foley may be explained by a 
change in attitude on the part of the Court. The Court seems to be 
placing a heavier emphasis on the importance of the rights, bene-
fits, and privileges of citizenship than on the employment rights of 
the legal resident alien. This possibility is recognized by Justice 
Stewart in his concurring opinion in Foley: 
The dissenting opinions convincingly demonstrate that it is 
difficult if not impossible to reconcile the Court's judgment in 
this case with the full sweep of the reasoning and authority of 
some of our past decisions. It is only because I have become in-
creasingly doubtful about the validity of those decisions (in at 
least some of which I concurred) that I join in the opinion of the 
Court in this case.144 
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Ambach v. Nor-
wick145 also suggests the possibility that the Court may be retract-
ing the scope of employment rights previously granted to the legal 
resident alien. In Norwick the Court overturned the decision of 
the New York Southern District Court.146 The lower court, in that 
139. 432 U.S. 1 (1977). 
140. N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 661(e) (McKinney Supp. 1978). 
141. 432 U.S. at 12. 
142. 413 U.S. at 646-47. 
143. 432 U.S. at 11. 
144. 435 U.S. at 300 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
145. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). 
146. Id. 
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case, found a New York statute147 which required public school 
teachers to be United States citizens unconstitutional. 148 Although 
the New York court had examined the statute with strict scru-
tiny ,149 the Supreme Court only looked to the statute for a rational 
basis.150 The Supreme Court made an initial determination that 
teaching in public schools constitutes a governmental function. 151 
It then proceeded to the conclusion that the statute bears a ra-
tional relationship to the State's interest of furthering its educa-
tional goals.152 
The Court's decision in Norwick is subject to a number of 
criticisms. As the dissent in that case points out, "it is logically im-
possible to differentiate between this case concerning teachers 
and In re Griffiths concerning attorneys." 153 The majority in Nor-
wick attempts to counter this point. New York's citizenship re-
quirement is limited to a governmental function because it applies 
only to teachers employed by and acting as agents of the state. In 
contrast, the Connecticut statute, held unconstitutional in In re 
Griffiths, applied to all attorneys though most do not work for the 
government. The exclusion of aliens from access to the bar in-
volved the right to pursue a chosen occupation rather than access 
to public employment.154 
An analysis of the Norwick decision shows a few weaknesses 
in the court's line of reasoning. First, the exclusion does not refer 
to the substance of the occupation. In determining whether a 
governmental function is involved, a teacher's duties are of 
greater import than the status of a teacher as a state employee. 
Second, the fact that teachers are state employees is not a proper 
basis to distinguish them from attorneys. "States owe all of their 
lawful residents, whether aliens or citizens, equal access to public 
as well as private employment, absent the necessity for restric-
tions designed to promote compelling state interests."155 
Both Norwick and Foley have a potentially far reaching effect 
in the area of state legislative restrictions of the employment 
147. N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 3001(3) (McKinney 1970). 
148. Ambach v. Norwick sub nom Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. at 922. 
149. Id. at 918. 
150. 441 U.S. 80 (1979). 
151. Id. at 75. 
152. Id. at 80. 
153. Id. at 81 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting). 
154. Id. at 76 n.6. 
155. 417 F. Supp. at 981 n.9. 
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right of the legal resident alien. Legislative repeal or amendment 
of restrictive statutes may slow or cease as a result of these deci-
sions. New restrictive legislation may proliferate. Absent limits 
on the state's power to classify employment as a political relation-
ship, a new mode of infringement upon employment rights of the 
legal resident alien may result. It is noteworthy that the decision 
in Foley has already been adopted by at least one lower New York 
court. In Di Franco v. City of New York, 156 a New York court 
upheld a code requirement157 which barred aliens from becoming 
policemen. 
An example of the potentially wide scope of the political ex-
ception is found in the California case of Chavez-Salido v. Cabell. 158 
In that case the state attempted to justify a restriction on a signif-
icant range of occupations which involve the powers of a peace 
officer.159 Those occupations include superintendents of cemeteries 
as well as sheriffs.160 
The issue may be even further compounded. If a court deter-
mines that an occupation fits within the hazy boundaries of the 
political exception, a restrictive statute itself will only be exam-
ined to determine whether it has a rational relationship to the 
state's interest.161 At that stage the statute is most likely to with-
stand constitutional challenge.162 It has been observed that "several 
recent decisions addressing the issue of aliens' right to work indi-
cate that the suspect class status of alienage is slowly eroding. As 
a result, it is possible that state action against aliens will no longer 
be strictly scrutinized .... "163 A return to the rational basis stan-
dard of scrutiny presents a serious threat to the established em-
ployment rights of the legal resident alien. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current constitutional status of New York statutes which 
restrict certain types of employment to citizens has been placed in 
156. DiFranco v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d 852, 389 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1976). 
157. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE Tit. A, ch. 18, § 434a-8.0 (1963). 
158. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977), vacated and remanded, 
436 U.S. 901 (1978). 
159. 427 F. Supp. at 170. 
160. 427 F. Supp. at 169-70, note 22. 
161. See Ambach v. Norwick, supra note 43; Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
162. See discussion, supra notes 43-47. 
163. Comment, Aliens' Right to Work: State and Federal Discrimination, 45 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 835, 838 (1977). 
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a state of flux by the decisions in Norwick and Foley. Before these 
cases were decided, it appeared that statutes which discriminated 
against aliens as a class would be examined with close judicial 
scrutiny .164 Any retreat from a standard of strict judicial scrutiny 
would result in a reduction of the already established employment 
rights of the legal resident alien. Although Norwick and Foley in-
dicate a retraction of employment rights, they may be explained 
or distinguished by the unique type of employment in each case. 
A refinement of the distinction between policy and non-policy 
making occupations is needed. The over-expansive political excep-
tion of Sugarman is unwarranted. Most of New York's restrictive 
statutes relate to common occupations of the community. Such 
statutes are unconstitutional, and it is recommended that they 
either be repealed by the New York legislature or be judicially in-
validated by the New York courts . Those official bodies should 
limit rather than promote the threatening trend against the estab-
lished employment rights of the legal resident alien. 
Claire M. Schenk 
164. See discussion, supra notes 35-42. 
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